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ABSTRACT
This thesis presents a method to determine the
capabilities of an emerging Third World submarine force. As
a "primer, " it examines the major factors that contribute to
the operational readiness and military effectiveness of a
submarine force. The areas discussed are national
characteristics, research and development, equipment,
training, and operations. The scope of the thesis is very
broad in nature, and covers topics as varied as preventive
maintenance, spare parts production, and crew training. The
areas are analyzed with respect to their importance in
estimating the submarine force's missions and capabilities.
The penultimate chapter of the thesis uses the methodology to
consider the significance of the Iranian acquisition of two
Kilo submarines from Russia. The methodology is condensed (in
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I . INTRODUCTION
This thesis provides a method for determining the
potential of any submarine force. This paper is not designed
to provide a comparison of the world's submarine forces, but
rather to give a technique for ascertaining the capability of
any given submarine force. John Benedict of Johns Hopkins
Applied Physics Laboratory has done a significant amount of
research in this area (Benedict, 1990, pp. 57-63) and this
thesis should complement his work by probing deeply into the
essence of what makes an effective submarine force.
As the number of nations that possess submarines
increases, and the number of submarines operated by these
nations also increases, the capability to distinguish between
a capable submarine force and an ineffective submarine force
becomes more important but also more difficult. Simply
adding up the number of submarines in each country gives
little information as some submarines are permanently tied to
piers or used for spare parts while other submarines are
inadequately maintained to perform lengthy patrols.
Comparing the number of submarines is also futile if the
training, age, capabilities and missions are not included in
the comparison. Two well-maintained submarines with
proficient crews can be a much greater threat than twenty
submarines that have not submerged in five years.
The thesis begins in Chapter II with a broad overview of
the national aspects of the country in question. Starting
with Mahan's elements of seapower, the state's position in
relation to the sea should be analyzed along with the coastal
tomography. The national leadership and characteristics of
the population should be examined to determine the
introspective perception of the purpose of the navy and the
submarine force. The missions that are assigned to the
submarine force should be correlated with the size of the
force. The distance, routes, and types of seagoing trade
should be considered and determined, as well as the political
relationships with other nations.
The industrial and technological capacity of the state
are discussed in Chapter III. These greatly influence the
capabilities of the submarine force. These areas should be
investigated to determine the research and development
devoted to submarine related issues and the ability to
produce submarines, their spare parts, and weapons. The
proficiency in maintaining and repairing modern warships and
the expertise in various specialized industries should also
be considered to facilitate the evaluation.
Infrastructure to support the submarine force is
discussed in Chapter IV. This is often an overlooked aspect
of submarine capabilities, but the number and size of bases
and the number of submarine tenders are important aspects in
force readiness that should be weighed in the analysis.
Chapter V discusses the equipment that is used by the
submarine force to add to its capabilities. A submarine crew
with a modern weapons system is likely to achieve a hit on a
slow moving merchant vessel if for no other reason than the
high-technology, self-searching, self-homing torpedo. Better
sensor systems enable the crew to detect targets farther away
and position the submarine for an effective attack.
Training and operations are discussed in Chapter VI.
These are absolutely vital to the readiness of the submarine
force. The types of training evolutions and operations can
also be good indicators of what a submarine force is capable
of in terms of missions and roles. Consideration must be
given to the success rate of the deployments and the problems
encountered during the operation as well as the manner in
which the problem was solved.
In Chapter VII, a brief analysis of the future Iranian
submarine force is presented as an illustration of how this
study's method may be applied. Inasmuch as this thesis is
purposely unclassified, and the assessment is limited to
information that is locally available, this chapter cannot be
more than suggestive. A full application of the method would
require, inter alia, very classified intelligence
information, detailed open-source research data, and specific
collection tasking on naval attaches, forces afloat, and so
on. It is hoped, nevertheless, that an unclassified, limited
open-source assessment of the world's newest submarine force
will encourage application of this method (using an all-
source approach) on other potentially hostile submarine
forces
.
The final chapter is a summary of the results of the
thesis
II. NATIONAL ASPECTS
The position of a nation with respect to other nations
and the surrounding waters must be considered when analyzing
a submarine force. An island nation such as Japan might
logically depend on its submarines to defend the country,
while a nation with a very small coastline and land borders
with threatening neighbors would probably place little
emphasis on a submarine force. Mahan's elements of seapower
(geographical position, physical conformation, extent of
territory, number of population, national character, and
character of the government) apply to a modern submarine
force in much the same way as they applied to a turn-of-the-
century navy (Mahan, 1991, pp. 27-47). These aspects normally
change very slowly over time, so they may be used as an
initial basis for considering how committed a nation is to
maintaining a submarine force and how adept that force could
be expected to be in any operational environment.
A. GEOGRAPHY
Mahan espoused elaborate theories about a nation's
geographical position in relation to other nations and the
sea. He asserted that a nation having large coastlines, easy
access to the sea, and no adjacent hostile nations is
perfectly situated for developing an effective navy (Mahan,
1991, pp. 27-47). Consider how some of Mahan's principles
mentioned above may be relevant to the development of a
capable submarine force.
1. Island Nations
The factors discussed above work in favor of island
nations like Australia, Cuba, Great Britain, Indonesia,
Japan, and Taiwan, which rely upon the sea and sea commerce
for their survival. Their navies strive to be capable of
controlling the adjacent seas, suggesting the need for a
proficient submarine force in order to preclude an invasion.
2. Sea-based Nations
Nations with long coastlines relative to their land
boundaries historically depend more on the sea than do other
nations. These littoral nations tend to look seaward for
commerce. The larger the amount of seaborne cargo in
relation to the country's needs, the greater the need of a
navy to protect that commerce with proficient naval and
submarine forces. Other nations with friendly land neighbors
and large coastlines, such as Canada, Denmark, Germany,
Italy, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, and the
United States, can also concentrate on building, maintaining
and operating a submarine force.
3. Coastlines
Mahan considered ready access to the sea a noteworthy
element of seapower (although he called it physical
conformation) . A measure of this access can be the length of
the coastline, but a better measure would probably be the
length of the nation's territorial sea. 1 This measure gives
a more realistic line which a navy needs to protect, because
it eliminates the length of little inlets and bays. An
example of the confusion using the coastline method shows
South Korea with a coastline of 2,413 kilometers whereas the
length of the South Korean territorial sea is only 1,100
kilometers.
4 . Surrounding Waters
The geography of the coastal waters plays an
important part in determining the capabilities of a submarine
force. Nations with a significant amount of shallow water
will likely have a submarine force that is adept at
operations in these areas, but less capable at open ocean
engagements. The small submarine (700 tons or less) is quite
capable in shallow waters, while larger submarines require
deeper waters. Even small submarines have their limits:
Certain water depths must be considered limiting values
for submarine operation. The following minimum water
depths are considered to be acceptable for known submarine
classes specially built for operations in shallow waters,
with an average displacement of 500-1,000 m 3 [tons]:
- 25 m for torpedo attacks,
- 40 m for possible escape tactics afterwards
- 18 m for mine-laying operations
.
(Boehm, 1989, pp. 110-112)
A correlation can be done between a nation's submarine types
and the tomography of the littoral waters. Nations with deep
water close to shore may prefer larger submarines, whereas a
nation with shallow waters out to a hundred miles presumably
Territorial Sea: the area of ocean that is within twelve nautical miles of the baseline of the
nation.
would be interested in smaller vessels. Notice should be
taken if these characteristics do not correlate, i.e. a
nation with a significant amount of shallow coastal water is
acquiring large ocean-going submarines.
B. CHARACTERISTICS OF THE NATION
The national characteristics should be examined to aid in
determining the objectives of acquiring a submarine force and
the supposed missions that will be assigned to the
submarines.
1. Leadership And Status
Every society may be analyzed for its leadership
philosophies and attitudes. Democracies can be expected to
have well-balanced military forces, with the navy sharing in
the defense budgets in approximate proportion to its- role in
the actual defense of the country's national interest.
Autocratic governments tend to favor armies useful for
suppressing internal dissension as well as for intimidating
adjacent nations.
A second dimension of national orientation is the
desire for international status. The national status in
relation to other nations as opposed to the status that it
desires will presumably influence the readiness and
effectiveness of the submarine force. If the nation acquired
the submarines solely as a national status symbol, motivation
to maintain a high operational readiness and force
effectiveness may be weak. If the nation acquired submarines
or built them indigenously to counter a suspected threat, the
navy is more likely to maintain the submarines in a state of
higher readiness.
2. Characteristics of the Population
The people within a nation must be considered to
assess how much support the submarine force will enjoy.
Nations with a large sea-based population will likely admire
and respect a submarine force, while those with little
attachment to the sea will probably neglect a submarine force
or if not despise it as a waste of resources. For example,
the attitudes toward submarines displayed in the Soviet Union
during the Cold War reflected ambiguities in national
estimation of seapower.
3. Role of the Navy
The role of the navy in protecting national interests
cannot be overemphasized, and submarine forces must be
analyzed as elements of naval power. The size and
composition of the entire navy must be reviewed. A navy
comprised mainly of small patrol vessels may utilize its
submarines for coastal defense -- or the submarines could be
used for distant operations. Navies with larger ocean-going
warships (destroyers and frigates) may be likely to employ
their submarines in forward defense, while forces with
cruisers and carriers could be anticipated to possess
submarines for deep-water offensive missions. Clearly, the
identity of putative enemies and assumptions about their
strategies influence a nation's naval planning, and this in
turn would affect their operations.
4. Traditions
The role of the navy, and specifically the submarine
force within a nation, can also be viewed from the traditions
of the country. A country with a extended history of using
the oceans will likely place more emphasis on its navy than
countries new to the seafaring trades, and a country with a
background in submarine operations will tend to honor and
respect their submarine force. These traditions will also
place the submarine force in high esteem with the civilians
and could influence the more intelligent and braver men to
apply for submarine service. This alone can be advantageous
in promoting the readiness and improvement of a submarine
force. The power of heritage is best expressed by Rudyard
Kipling in The Fringes Of The Fleet:
The submarine has created its own type of officer and man
— with language and traditions apart from the rest of the
Service, and yet at heart unchangingly of the Service.
(Heinl, 1966, p. 312)
The men and their attitudes are the intangible items that can
change a submarine from an ineffective national showpiece
into a highly lethal warfighting platform.
C. OVERSEAS INTERESTS
The distance and routes which foreign trade takes is also
important to determining the probable requirements of a
submarine force. These overseas interests have a direct
bearing on the missions that the submarine force may be
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called upon to perform. So too do foreign alliances and
relations.
1. Distance and Trade Routes
The distance over which a country's imports must
travel will affect the size, composition, and operations of
its navy as will the routes that the goods must take in
transit. The submarine force may be affected by those
factors. To protect commerce in distant waters requires high
endurance warships and long range submarines. Trade that
must flow through chokepoints can be protected by smaller
submarines. Distance and chokepoints are very applicable to
Japan which imports 68% of its oil from the Middle East
through the Straits of Malacca (Basic Petroleum Data Book,
1992, Section IX, Table lOi). This places the Japanese Navy
in the extreme position of probably having to defend a very
long oil supply line during any conflict that could threaten
that supply line.
2. Nature of Trade
An appraisal should be conducted on the nature of the
merchant shipping that flows into and out of a country. This
appraisal should determine whether the trade is just
commercially desirable, economically vital or required to
sustain the life of the nation. Japan is an example of a
nation that relies on shipping for its very survival because
"Japan must import 50% of its requirement for other grains
[not including rice] and fodder crops." (World Factbook 1991,
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1991, p. 160) The result of this analysis will lead to some
conclusions as to the importance of the navy in general, and
the submarine force in particular, in the protection of this
shipping.
3. Foreign Relations
The relations that a country has with its neighbors
or with other nations that share similar national interests
will also help to set the context in which the submarine
force can be evaluated. Alliances with distant countries
will probably reguire long range warships just to conduct
exercises with the allied navy. A treaty which discusses
naval matters and allows one nation to concentrate on anti-
surface missions while another devotes resources to the
antisubmarine missions will give an idea as to the primary
mission of each nation's submarine force.
A nation with surrounded by enemies will likely have
a submarine force designed to protect its shores from the
most likely enemy. The submarine force might be capable of
conducting offensive operations against the supposed threat,
but due to priorities it will probably not be trained to
conduct missions in the far corners of the ocean.
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III. INDUSTRIAL AND TECHNOLOGICAL CAPABILITIES
The ability of a nation to conduct research and
development and actual production of a submarine and its
systems is probably a dependable indicator for determining
the capabilities of a submarine force.
A. RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT
A nation has many reasons for developing its defense
research and development (R&D) capabilities, such as: to
oppose hostile neighbors, to increase its own independence of
action, to counter unreliable suppliers, to increase the
economic and technological base within the country, to reap
economic benefits by becoming a supplier of weapons systems,
and to expand its political influence through arms exports
(Catrina, 1990, pp. 11-21). Any nation developing a
submarine force will be doing so for one or more of these
reasons. For whatever reasons a nation develops its R&D
capabilities, many benefits can be gained, including
increasing the civilian technology base or increasing the
population's standard of living.
1. Oceanographic
The exploration of the oceans is of primary
importance to a submariner. This exploration can be limited
to a country's coastal waters due to the limited scope of
submarine operations, but at a minimum a country should
13
devote resources to explore the ocean areas in which its




The initial stages of designing weapons requires many-
resources that most developing nations lack: money,
technology, skilled personnel, and industrial capabilities.
These and other limitations preclude most countries from
being independent of the advanced nations which supply arms.
Most nations rely on the highly developed states to perform
the research and development of advanced weapons and then
acquire rights to produce these weapons. The willingness of
a country to engage in hostilities may be reduced if war
would result in diminished access to modern weapon systems.
B. INDIGENOUS PRODUCTION AND IMPORTS
Whether discussing entire submarines, spare parts, or
weapons, the costs and benefits in resources, manpower, and
infrastructure of indigenous production must be weighed
against the disadvantages of importing.
1. Submarine Production
The building of submarines is a highly complex task
requiring a wide variety of skills and technologies. This is
exemplified by the fact that only eighteen countries have
produced submarines; two of these (Spain and Denmark) have
not produced submarines in the last five years, and six of
them have only recently become submarine producers — all
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building foreign-designed boats (Jane's Fighting Ships, 1992-
93). The ability to produce submarines within a nation not
only gives that nation a secure supply in a long-term
conflict (presuming access to critical raw materials) , but
also provides the country with an inventory of gualified
repair personnel for maintaining a submarine force. More and
more nations are acquiring the skills to build submarines as
they realize the importance of being able to complete the
construction process indigenously. In developing the Collins
Class submarine, Australia has adopted as a primary objective
the goal of minimizing foreign suppliers because the
Australian government and Royal Australian Navy (RAN) feel
that the "deterrent value in the region will be enhanced" if
the submarines can be built and maintained in Australia
(Young, 1991, pp. 42-55).
A nation can also be quite capable of building a
submarine by having the metal and machinery stocks, a pool of
skilled labor, and the dockyards to produce the warships, yet
be unable to build a submarine due to the unavailability of
weapons and sensor systems. Reverse engineering these
components after acquisition of a submarine is a possibility.
Many developing nations could probably follow this
path. (Slade, 1991, p. 32)
2 . Spare Parts
There are two important aspects when considering
spare parts: place of production and stockpiles. Any naval
15
ship requires spare parts, and a submarine's requirements
often exceed those of its surface ship counterparts. Thus,
while a surface ship can go to sea with questionable ship
control systems, it is absolutely vital that the same systems
be fully operational on a submarine. A loss of propulsion to
a surface ship will require that the ship be towed to port,
but a corresponding loss of propulsion to a submarine could
place the submarine in an unrecoverable depth excursion which
would destroy the submarine and kill its crew. Therefore, a
submarine must have readily available supplies of spare parts
to keep vital ship systems fully functional. A foreign
supplier entails that availability of components could be
limited or nonexistent during a conflict unless stockpiling
were done prior to the conflict. Even if some stockpiling
were conducted, the supplies could run short during an
extended conflict or embargo. The Argentine experience
during the conflict over the Falklands is a perfect example
of how this shortage can hinder submarine operations. The
U.S. had placed an arms embargo on Argentina in 1976, and by
1982 the embargo had "severely hampered" the "Argentine
efforts to keep these boats [U.S. GUPPY Fleet submarine]
operational.
"
(Sheina, 1984, pp. 114-120) The preferable
source for vital spare parts is an indigenous producer. This
would give the nation unlimited access to those spare parts
and allow the submarine force to operate without restrictions
caused by shortages of maintenance components. In times of
16
crisis, indigenous production would in theory provide a
supply unhindered by any economic embargo or blockade.
3. Weapons Production
Similarly, the nation that truly desires to be free
of outside interference must have freedom from arms
suppliers. Producing submarine torpedoes requires a well-
developed technology base even if done under license from
another country that performs the design and development.
Currently only ten nations are producing torpedoes: China,
France, Germany, India, Italy, Japan, Russia, Sweden, the
U.K., and the U.S. (Friedman, 1989, pp. 416-433).
Stockpiling of weapons will allow non-producing nations to
overcome this dilemma in short crisis situations; but the
ability of a submarine force to wage war for extended periods
of time will be hampered if the nation cannot produce its own
torpedoes
.
C. MAINTENANCE AND REPAIR
Any nation with a submarine force needs adequate repair
facilities to ensure the continued operational readiness of
its. The repair facilities should be extensive in nature in
order to return even badly-damaged ships to operational
status.
1. Number of Maintenance Facilities
Because there are severe limits on a submarine force
with only one operational base, a nation serious about using
a submarine force in a wartime environment generally will
17
need more than one harbor capable of operating and repairing
the submarines. They can be kept in port by only a limited
number of ASW ships in blockade. And if the submarines are
at sea at the beginning of a crisis, their covertness
eventually is compromised by having to proceed to and from
one particular port. The limits imposed on a submarine force
by having only one operational base are clearly restrictive
and will cripple the force if damage occurs to the base
during a war or natural catastrophe.
The strategic advantage of multiple ports has been
proven throughout naval history. The most recent example
would be the British having to split up their 1982 Falklands
War assets to watch all the Argentine naval ports; this
allowed the San Luis to exit and enter port and operate
relatively unhindered throughout the operations area (Sheina,
1984, pp. 114-120). Although the perceived threat was
surface-based in nature (the cruiser Belgrano and the carrier
Veintecinco de Mayo) (Woodward, 1992, pp. 123-124), the
British nuclear attack submarines (SSNs) are some of the best
in the area of Anti-Submarine Warfare (ASW) . If a diesel
submarine can slip by the Royal Navy, other nations are
likely to attempt to use their submarines in wartime if the
port facilities are available. Multiple submarine bases
magnify the ASW problem of an enemy and can compel an enemy
to split his forces.
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2. Major Repairs and Overhauls: Indigenous vs Foreign
As described above for the repair facilities, the
number and location of drydocks capable of supporting a
submarine overhaul also will help determine the capability of
the submarine force. Having to send submarines to a foreign
country for an overhaul or hull cleaning implies that the
nation is unable to support the submarine force for an
extended period of time and unwilling to commit the resources
to make its submarine force a high priority. The company
that produced the submarine is likely to have the facilities
to perform major maintenance and, like HDW (builders of the
Type 209) , are more than willing to effect this maintenance
(Ude, 1986, p. 3). Sending of submarines to an overseas
shipyard implies that the submarines are for short duration
conflicts or show the flag type missions.
3. Routine Maintenance
The performance of a submarine force is highly
dependent on the quality and quantity of routine maintenance.
Routine maintenance includes preventative maintenance,
corrosion protection, and periodic equipment tests. All of
these items can help to increase the effectiveness of a
submarine force. The quality of routine maintenance should
take into account the attitude of the personnel. The amount
of preventative maintenance can probably be estimated by the
activity around a submarine while it is in port. Corrosion
protection can be evaluated by the amount of rust seen on the
19
surface of the submarine or -- perhaps — correlated to the
quantity of corrosion that is evident on the surface ships
within the Navy. The abundance of equipment tests might be
approximated by observing the types and quantity of non-crew
personnel that board the submarine, including technicians
from foreign country. Any other ways to determine the
caliber and amount of routine maintenance will help to weigh
the effectiveness of a submarine force.
D. SPECIALIZED INDUSTRIES
Many industries are involved in supporting a submarine
force, but several are vital. These industries can be
crucial to the readiness of the submarines, and every effort
should be made to determine the capabilities of the nation in
each area.
1. Optics
The need for periscopes on submarines became apparent
from the very beginning of submarines. Today most periscopes
have become multipurpose tools with many features that
enhance the submarine's ability to detect, locate, classify,
and attack an opponent. The nucleus of the periscope is the
optics which allow the submariner to see. Non-Russian
producers of periscopes include Carl Zeiss (Germany)
,
Kollmorgen (U.S.), Barr & Stroud (U.K.), Sagem and Sopelem
(both in France) ("Above Water Sensors," 1986, p. 57). The
small number of companies that produce and repair periscopes
is prima facie evidence that periscopes are costly and
20
sophisticated. Any indication that a nation is developing a
high technology optics industry could imply that it is trying
to become independent in this area of submarine maintenance.
2. Welding
The construction and repair of modern submarines
reguires an proficiency with advanced welding technigues for
thick hull plating. The pressures to which the submarine can
be subjected at deep depths are extreme (3.07 MPa or 445 lbs
per sguare inch at 1000 feet) , and simple welding technigues
do not hold out the sea water. Sea water piping is subjected
to the same pressures as the hull and reguire the same
welding technigues. A country must be prepared to send its
submarines to a foreign port for any sea water piping or hull
repair if there is not an indigenous capability to perform
this type of work. Obviously a submarine-producing nation
has this capability, but the countries that do not produce
submarines should be watched closely for any indications that
high technology welding skills are being developed.
3. Electronics
There are several systems on submarines reguire
electronics: Navigation, Sonar, Electronic Support Measures
(ESM) , Fire Control, and Communications. While all of these
functions can be performed without the aid of electronics,
most submarines incorporate modern circuitry to perform some
or all of these functions. Despite the fact that most of
these systems are well designed with low failure rates, a
21
nation must be capable of repairing such mission-critical
items quickly in order to allow their submarines to operate
unrestricted by equipment limitations. A nation with a
limited ability to repair electronics will possibly have a
reduced submarine operational capability unless there are
indications that the submarine force is given priority for
the resources and technical repair capabilities of the
country.
4. Batteries
The foremost method that should be used to evaluate
the submerged endurance of a submarine is the battery
capacity. More generally, the better the battery system (in
reliability, storage capacity, and recharging rate) , the more
capable the submarine is of conducting demanding tasks such
as a submerged ASUW approach or an ASW barrier patrol
mission.
a. Maintenance
The skills and technologies required to maintain
a modern submarine battery involve a significant amount of
training and practical experience. These skills are not
beyond most developing countries, but the amount of training
devoted to battery maintenance is often considered crucial
when determining the capabilities of a submarine force. For
example the battery in the TR1700 has 960 Varta battery
cells, which makes for a very complex and management-critical
maintenance schedule (Dicker, 1983, p. 1293).
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b. Production
The production of submarine batteries is a task
of such complexity that many countries must rely upon a
foreign manufacturer. The limits imposed on a diesel
submarine by an old or damaged battery places production of
submarine batteries at the forefront of any submarine force's
requirements. There are five major suppliers of submarine
batteries (SAFT in France, Varta in Germany, Hagen in
Germany, Tudor in Sweden, and Chlorides in the U.K.) that
will produce batteries of all sizes and shapes to meet the
need of any submarine force ("Propulsion," 1986, pp. 50-51).
These companies engage in intensive research and development
to improve their product; and these companies, like Hagen
Batterie AG of Germany, are willing to co-produce or grant
production licenses to other countries (Hagen has sold these
rights to five nations -- Israel, Norway, Turkey, South
Korea, and India) (Hagen Batterie AG, 1991, p.l).
5. Advanced Technologies
There are several areas of advanced technologies
which should be taken into account when determining a
submarine's capabilities. Current trends in submarine
technology are to increase the submerged endurance of the
submarine through a variety of air-independent propulsion
(AIP) systems. These AIP systems allow a submarine to stay
submerged longer, thus increasing its stealth and decreasing
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its indiscretion rate. 2 AIP technologies currently being
investigated include the use of Stirling engines, fuel cells,
closed-cycle diesels, and innovative waste gas storage (i.e.
torrodial hulls) (Benedict, 1992) . An indication of research
in any of these technologies would tend to indicate that a
nation is developing advanced capabilities for its submarines
which could greatly increase their submarine's potential.
6. Sound Silencing Technology
The use of technology in design and manufacture to
reduce sound in submarines has three major facets; namely
propellers, sound mounts, and propulsion equipment. All
three of these areas require high technology development
systems, sophisticated production machinery, and
conscientious maintenance procedures. The ability to make
quiet and efficient propellers is beyond the expertise of
most developing nations, but that need not keep countries
from importing the technology, milling equipment, and
materials to attempt such a feat. Propulsion equipment such
as reduction gears, electric motors, and bearings are within
the production abilities of most developing countries, to
produce, but the fabricating of quiet specimens requires more
precise manufacturing facilities and technological refinement
than such countries have the skills to perform. Effective
Indiscretion Rate (IR) for a given speed is defined as:
Time required to return the battery to full charge by snorkel ing
IR =
Time required to discharge the battery to some minimum level
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sound mounts require not only a production infrastructure,
but also the electronic processing equipment to determine the
ability of the mount actually to isolate the vibrations from
foundation of the equipment.
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IV. INFRASTRUCTURE
Infrastructure of the submarine force includes bases,
pier space, tender support, drydocks, and maintenance
facilities. Maintenance was discussed in an earlier section;
the following sections present the first four items.
A. SUBMARINE BASES
The number of bases, amount of pier space, size and
number of submarine tenders, and the availability of drydocks
are important aspects of a submarine force's infrastructure
that will help to determine the capabilities and limitations
of the individual submarines.
1. Number of Bases
To a submarine force composed of large ocean-going
submarines, the number of bases is vital to the sustainment
of the operational submarines. Large submarines (greater
than 1700 tons) have drafts greater than five meters and need
logistical support normally not available at civilian ports.
While smaller submarines can get diesel fuel in any fishing
port and restock their consumable supplies from a corner
grocery store, taking on more weapons normally reguires
dedicated support from land-based infrastructure (although as
discussed below, this operation can be supported by a
submarine tender) . The number of bases must be considered in
relation to the size of the submarines, and any use of non-
26
military ports by submarines should be noted, because this
adds flexibility to the force in a crisis.
2. Pier space
The amount of pier space is tied almost directly to
the number of submarine bases, but in addition the submarines
can be supported at any naval base. A nation with several
small submarine bases would have a greater warfighting
capability if each base could individually maintain the
entire submarine force. This of course is an ideal which
cannot always be realized, but the more flexible the
infrastructure, the more capable the submarine force.
3 . Tender Support
One aspect often overlooked when examining the
capabilities of a naval force is the afloat support
structure. For a submarine force, a tender is almost vital
for wartime operations. A tender provides a submarine force
with the capability to deploy without the constraints of
having to return to a base for fuel, weapons, or supplies.
The tender also allows a submarine to be repaired while away
from the nation. Moreover, an illusion of having a submarine
at sea threatening another nation might be maintained when in
actuality the submarine is being serviced in an obscure
location; a tender becomes a "capabilities multiplier" for
any submarine force. When the French Navy sends a diesel
submarine to the Indian Ocean, a tender travels to the ports
that will be visited "to preserve the know-how in
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implementing the logistical support indispensable for full
submarine availability . " (Fustier , 1989, pp. 32-36)
4 . DrydocJcs
The number of drydocks that can hold a submarine is
an indirect method for determining the abilities of a
submarine force. The extreme case — a country without a
suitable drydock — cannot conduct extensive repairs on
damaged submarines, nor is the country able to perform
extensive maintenance procedures on the hulls of the
submarines.
5. Training Facilities
The extensiveness of the training facilities should
be examined. The number of buildings is a basic
consideration, but the types of simulators and training aids
are also important. This topic is discussed in more detail
in the section on training.
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V. EQUIPMENT
The submarines themselves are valuable indicators for
determining the capabilities of the force, but particularly
the weapons systems, sensors, navigation systems, and fire
control systems must be considered. These systems change the
submarine from a simple submersible to a warfighting
platform.
A. SUBMARINE
The basic cornerstone of any submarine force must be the
submarines themselves. The capabilities of each type of
submarine must be thoroughly evaluated using all the
information that can be gathered through any channels. The
smallest morsel of information may be remarkably important in
helping to determine what missions the submarine force is
capable of executing successfully.
1. Size of the Submarine
The first look at any submarine force should be the
size of the submarines that are operational. As will be
shown later, simple measurements like length, beam, and
displacement can be used to determine many aspects of the
submarine's performance. In general, submarines can be
divided into three groups based on displacement: small (less




a. Small Submarines (less than 700 tons)
The small submarines are ideally suited for
coastal operations of limited duration. These submarines
(usually less than fifty meters in length) can maneuver into
places where larger submarines are incapable of operating.
In addition, the small submarines have shallower drafts (less
than five meters) which allow them to go into harbors with
depths that would thwart the larger submarines. The smaller
submarines also have fewer personnel (eighteen to twenty-two
men) and smaller consumable loadouts, thus enabling them to
be resupplied and refueled in any port capable of handling a
fishing vessel of nominal size. These advantages are offset
by a number of disadvantages: very poor seakeeping in non-
coastal waters, limited endurance in both fuel and personnel
supplies, a minimum weapons load (six to eight torpedoes),
and slow submerged speeds (less than eighteen knots).
b. Medium Submarines (700 to 700 tons)
These submarines are particularly suited to
forward defense. They are a compromise between the long-
range, ocean-going large submarines and the short-range,
shallow-water small submarines and are well suited for local
operations in littoral waters. The medium submarines have a
longer range and patrol endurance than their smaller
counterparts, but still do not have the size necessary to be
effective blue-water, warfighting platforms (although open-
ocean commerce raiding is well within the capabilities of a
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medium-size submarine) . In comparison to the small
submarines, medium size submarines have a larger weapons
loadout (twelve to sixteen torpedoes) and higher submerged
speeds (eighteen to twenty-three knots) . The larger crews
(generally twenty-two to thirty-two men) and longer patrol
endurances mean that a larger quantity of consumables must be
carried. The lengths of medium size submarines (roughly
forty-eight to sixty-five meters) gives them improved sea-
keeping ability, but do not give the medium submarines
extended blue-water capabilities due to poor performance in
rough weather.
c. Large Submarines (greater than 1700 tons)
Today's large submarines are the heirs of the
World War Two "Gato/Balao" Fleet-class submarines built by
the United States. These submarines are usually long (more
than sixty meters) , and with the added weight and size, and
are very effective for blue-water operations. Their larger
diameters (exceeding six-and-a-half meters) also add to open
ocean capabilities, but limit their operations in shallow
water. The older submarines have larger crews (greater than
fifty men) , but the newer submarines are incorporating high
technology automation allowing them to have crews as small as
the medium size submarines. The larger weapon loadouts
(fourteen to twenty-four torpedoes) and more space for
consumables allow longer wartime patrols without having to
return to port for resupply and rearming. The large
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submarines also carry more fuel and are capable of routinely-
crossing the oceans. Unfortunately, the larger size does not
improve the speed capabilities when compared to the medium
submarines, but most of the large submarines have increased
battery sizes that give them longer submerged endurance for
a given speed.
2. Age
Newer submarines are usually more capable fighting
ships, but older submarines should be given the benefit of
the doubt. Conventional submarines have not fundamentally
changed since World War Two and surface ships are still
ineffective at finding a submarine and incapable of defeating
the torpedo. The German 1944 Type XXI is very similar to the
1980s-era Type 209 (1500) [as shown by the Table 1], with the
major changes
TABLE 1: COMPARISON OF WORLD WAR TWO AND MODERN SUBMARINES
TYPE XXI TYPE 209 (1500)
Surf/Subm Displc. (tons) 1621 / 1819 1660 / 1850
Length/Beam (m/m) 76.7 / 8.0 64.4 / 6.5
Surf/Subm Speed (knots) 15.5 / 17.5 11 / 22
Submerged Horsepower 4,800 4,600
Surf Range/Speed (nm/kts) 15,500 / 10 13000 / 10
Subm Range/ Speed (nm/kts) 365 / 5 400 / 4 (est)
Torpedo Tubes/size (#/mm) 6 / 533 8 / 533
No. of Crew 57 40
Refs: Jane's Fighting Ships, 1992-93 and
Submarines of World War Two
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being the reduced crew due to automation and the smaller size
due to submerged streamlining. Their similarities are
astounding and the older submarines can perform most of the
missions with much the same effectiveness. The one mission
area which has progressed beyond the older submarine's
capabilities is ASW. Finding a modern quiet submarine and
hitting it with a torpedo are probably beyond the abilities
of pre-1960s submarines.
3. Technology
The 1991 Persian Gulf conflict has shown that high
technology weapons are operationally powerful and remarkably
accurate. Although unproven in that conflict, technology in
submarine warfare is also important. The ability of a
submarine to find and destroy a warship can require
sophisticated hardware, especially in a large open-ocean
scenario. Surface warships are quieter, with long range ASW
sensors quite capable of detecting a noisy submarine and long
range weapons that can easily destroy an unsuspecting
submarine. To provide for self-protection and offensive
capabilities, a modern submarine employing high technology
sound silencing, sensors, and weapons stands a better chance
of conducting a successful mission. But, while technology is
important, it should not be overemphasized, as it may also be
a drawback in some respects. For example, during the 1982
Falklands War, the Argentine submarines could not fire their
sophisticated SUT-4 torpedoes due to inoperable fire control
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systems an inability to effectively use wire-guided torpedoes
(Sheina, 1984, pp. 114-120). Mistrust of the high-technology
Tigerfish torpedo may have been what led the commander of the
British submarine Conqueror to use antiquated World War Two
Mk 8 torpedoes to sink the Argentine cruiser Belgrano.
4. Capabilities
The capabilities discussed in this section are those
that are built into the submarine and cannot be changed




Several variables that must be considered when
determining a submarine's patrol endurance are fuel capacity
and usage rates, and consumable storage capacity versus crew
size. Fuel capacity and usage rates more appropriately come
under the heading of range and will be discussed in that
paragraph. Consumable storage must be compared to the crew
size. A large modern submarine with significant automation
will require fewer crew members and will more likely have a
longer patrol endurance due to more space for consumables.
The amount of consumable storage will probably be imprecise
since prior to an actual combat patrol a submarine can always
carry more food by stacking cans in the passageways and other
places not normally reserved for food storage.
b. Submerged Endurance
This is a very sensitive subject since most
nations consider this information highly classified. The
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submerged endurance of any diesel submarine is based on three
major parameters: battery energy capacity, size of the
submarine, and speed. Several publications have developed
formulas which can be used to correlate speed and the size of
the submarine. The best method to use appears to be that
presented in Strategic Antisubmarine Warfare and Naval
Strategy (Stefanick, 1987, pp. 142-143):
This formula relates the length (L:feet), the beam (B:feet),
and the shaft horsepower (P
s ) to the maximum submerged speed
(V:knots) of a submarine. The coefficient K
{
is approximately
25 for modern single-propeller submarines. Another useful




It associates the displacement (Dimeters 3 ) and shaft
horsepower to the velocity with the constant K2 being
approximately equal to 6.91 for a modern diesel-electric
submarine. Using empirical data on current classes of
submarines listed in Jane's Fighting Ships
,
it can be shown
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that these two equations are closely associated with a
correlation coefficient of 0.871.
The last aspect that needs to be integrated is
the battery energy capacity. Using data supplied by Hagen
Batter ie of Germany, an estimate of the approximate power








This equation relates the time on the battery (T: hours) and
the mass of the battery (M:tons) to the power output for the
battery (P
c
:kilowatts) using two constants, K3 equal to 21 and
C equal to -0.865. Either of the first two equations can be
used in connection with the third equation (including a
factor for power conversion and propulsion efficiency) to
give an indication of the endurance of a submarine operating
on the battery.
c . Range
The range of a submarine depends on the speed and
the fuel capacity. For a given amount of fuel, the equations
presented above are perfectly valid for a submerged submarine
using a snorkel. For submarines cruising on the surface,
normal surface ship fuel consumption versus speed equations
can be applied. These calculations should be done to
determine the approximate range of a given type of submarine.
Small nations with short coastlines will probably not need
36
the longer range inherent in larger submarines. But close
attention should be given to a nation which acquires long
range submarines because they can be sent to any area of
ocean.
d. Open-Ocean Potential
Large submarines have better sea-going
capabilities, but the nation may not need blue-water
submarines. The open-ocean potential of a submarine force
must be examined first from the aspect of the size of the





High speed submarines are nice to have, but are
not necessary for local operations. Most of the smaller
submarines have speeds which are adequate for performing any
assigned mission. The higher speed submarines are well
suited to perform open-ocean missions, whereas a nation with
low speed submarines can probably be evaluated as intending
them for coastal defense. It should be noted that in shallow
waters, maneuverability and size are more important than
speed. The acoustical advantage of a submarine operating in
shallow seas more than offsets the reduced speed capabilities
of a smaller submarine. In shallow waters a submarine's
primary means of escape is not speed. Notice should be taken
of a nation which has declared coastal protection a primary
concern but actually has high speed submarines.
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5. What Missions can the submarine perform?
The missions which a submarine can perform are varied
and complex in nature. Some require a significant amount of
training and expertise and a sophisticated submarine, while
others can be accomplished successfully with little training
and an obsolete platform.
a. ASW
The ability of a diesel-electric submarine to
conduct antisubmarine warfare (ASW) is extremely limited due
to the restrictions placed on processing power by the
electric power available from the battery. To detect and
attack a modern submarine requires sensitive sensors and
powerful processing systems which would quickly drain a
conventional submarine's batteries. Although some diesel
submarines carry ASW weapons, these can be considered to be
available for self defense only.
b. ASUW
A submarine is a superb anti-surface warfare
(ASUW) platform due to its inherent stealth and destructive
weapons system. An evaluation needs to be conducted to rate
the ability of a nation's submarines to detect surface ships
using their sonar systems. Modern submarines should be able
to detect surface ships out to one convergence zone in deep
water. In shallow water, the submarine's sonar system
provides a slightly better detection performance than being
on the surface and searching visually. The two limiting
factors for a submarine in ASUW are submerged approach speed
and the weapons capabilities. Both of these are discussed in
their respective sections.
c. Special Operations
Most diesel-electric submarines are perfectly
suited for conducting special operations due to their small
size and stealth. The determining factors for special
operations are simply the number and size of the "lock-
in/ lock-out" systems and the space available for extra
personnel, i.e. divers/frogmen/scouts. These two aspects
must be evaluated for each class of submarine to determine




Diesel-electric submarines are also well suited
for mining operations. Depending on the design of the
submarine, mines can be carried internally (two mines take
the same amount of storage as one torpedo) or externally in
a minebelt that can hold several dozen mines. While this
mission is often overlooked due to the limited number of
mines that a submarine can carry, it should be remembered
that in World War Two 658 mines were deployed by the Allied
submarines in the Pacific which caused fifty-two Japanese
ships to be damaged or sunk; that represents a ratio of 12
mines for each ship damaged (Moore, 1987, p. 25). In
addition, German mines planted off the coast of the United
States caused several ports to be shut on just the threat of
39
mines. But this function should be evaluated for each
submarine that a nation possesses to help determine the
overall capabilities of the submarine force.
e. Surveillance/Reconnaissance/Electronic Warfare
The ability to conduct reconnaissance of a beach
or surveillance of a harbor is also a suitable mission for a
diesel-electric submarine. The surveillance/reconnaissance
mission requires few capabilities and generally could be
performed by an obsolete submarine. The electronic warfare
mission requires more modern technology and more space for
the detection and processing equipment. If either one of
these requirements is not met, the ability of the submarine





Attacks on shore targets is a relatively new
major mission for submarines. Prior to the 1960s, most
submarines had deck guns to perform limited strike missions,
but during the middle years of the Cold War this mission
disappeared. With the advent of the submarine-launched land-
attack missile, the strike mission has been reassigned to the
submarine force. Only the United States and Russia have the
weapons systems and submarines to perform strike missions;
but careful attention needs to be given to other nations in
order to detect any signs that this capability is being
attained.
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g. Search and Rescue
To perform search and rescue (SAR) , a submarine
does not even need to submerge. This alone makes the search
and rescue mission an easy one. Obviously, however, the
stealth of a submerged submarine greatly enhances the ability
of the ship to perform a SAR mission, especially in a hostile
area of the ocean. Yet even this category of the SAR mission
requires very limited capabilities in a submarine.
6. How many is enough?
The number of submarines that are adequate depends on
the missions that the submarine force will be called upon to
perform. Can a nation with two submarines offer a credible
threat? Conventional wisdom says that a two submarine force
is too small to maintain an acceptable influx of submarine
personnel or submarine readiness. Thus, the French
government believes that to have an effective force "two
submarines must be ready at all times to put to sea." To
meet this requirement the French Navy concludes that a
minimum of four submarines "guarantees at least two fully
operational submarines at all times" and also provides "a
satisfactory flow of submarine personnel" and "allows the
submarine maintenance yards to be organized and managed
effectively." ("Creating A Submarine Force The French Way,"
1989, p. 46)
Looking from another aspect, the number of submarines
required depends on the missions which will be assigned to
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the submarine force and the area of operations. Given the
current levels of submarine forces and an assumed eighty mile
ocean boundary around each nation, the average ocean area per
submarine is 160,000 square miles (200 x 80). This area is
also significant, because a diesel submarine searching at 4
knots with a detection range of twenty miles can cover this
area in approximately 100 ours of submerged operation
(Koopman, 1946, pp. 95-107). This coincides with the
submerged endurance of many modern submarines. Logically
this leads to the supposition that any submarine force that
has more than one submarine for every two hundred miles of
territorial sea perimeter could be presumed to be offensive
in nature.
A basic measure for helping to determine the
capabilities of a submarine force is the size of the force.
The variety of missions that can be performed effectively
depends to some degree on whether a nation has a small force
(three or fewer submarines), a medium force (four to seven
submarines) or a large ^orce (at least eight submarines)
.
a. Small Submarine Force (up to three submarines)
A small force of only two or three submarines is
limited in the operations that can be performed effectively.
As ASUW platforms, three submarines will be ineffective as
commerce raiders against a large merchant fleet. These
submarines, due to a limited quantity of weapons and possible
destruction from escorts, would be effective only in a
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terrorist manner. The actual threat to commerce for an
extended period of time would be restricted in numbers and
area.
On the other hand, a small submarine force can
effectively frustrate an amphibious operation by inflicting
enough damage on an enemy task force to cause a withdrawal or
subseguent defeat on the ground. Against warships engaged in
a blockade or sustained strike operations, a small submarine
force could present a threat, but would not likely cause a
proficient navy to be completely deterred from carrying out
operations in the submarine's area. The British were worried
about the possibility of an attack from an Argentinean
submarine in the Falklands conflict; but the British task
force commander felt that the threat would be limited to the
inshore shallow waters as coastal defense platforms
(Woodward, 1992, p. 123). Special operations and
reconnaissance are well within the scope of a small submarine
force; but extensive mining and large area ASW are not
missions that a small submarine force can perform with a
great degree of success. "Declaratory mining" or terrorist
minelaying also can be accomplished by one or two submarines,
with little risk in most cases.
b. Medium Submarine Force (four to seven submarines)
A submarine force composed of from four to seven
submarines can perform almost any mission with the possible
exceptions of full-scale commerce raiding and sea denial
43
against a strong navy. A medium submarine force can be used
in limited commerce raiding, as an effective deterrent to an
amphibious force, and as competent weapons against surface
warships. Throughout this century of submarine warfare,
there has not been an instance of a small or medium submarine
force effectively controlling an area of ocean. Although a
medium submarine force can be proficient at ASW, it is more
likely to be geared toward other missions. As will be
discussed later, four submarines is considered the minimum
for an effective fighting force, although even a single
submarine must be regarded as a lethal threat.
c. Large Submarine Force (eight or more submarines)
The larger submarine forces are more likely to be
proficient in all areas of submarine operations. The larger
numbers imply a greater commitment to an effective force and
also suggest that the submarines will not be overlooked in
training, exercises, and operations. Surprisingly, sixteen
nations (37% of nations with submarine forces) have large
submarine forces: China, France, Germany, Greece, India,
Italy, Japan, North Korea, Norway, Peru, Russia, Sweden,
Spain, Turkey, the U.K., and the U.S. Most of these forces
probably have the capability to conduct sustained combat
operations and are likely to be proficient in all areas of
submarine operations. All except Greece, Norway, and Peru
are building or have built submarines, and all of the nations
could presumably produce them again in a war or crisis.
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Germany began World War One with twenty-four submarines of
modest capabilities but nearly won the Battle for the
Atlantic by having the capability to build more (340 more
during the course of the war) (Lindsay, 1980, pp. 32-41). The
production of submarines is probably needed to sustain a
highly effective and capable submarine force, particularly in
wartime or during a lengthy confrontation.
7. Weapon Storage
The versatility of a submarine can be estimated by
the number of weapons that the submarine can store for a
deployment. Some of the earlier Type 209s could store
torpedoes only in the tubes (six or eight) , while the larger
modern submarines can carry twenty or more in the torpedo
room. The weapons storage capabilities can be gauged from
the external dimensions of the submarine and the method of
loading the torpedoes. The larger submarines usually hold
more weapons and the submarines that require loading through
the front of the torpedo tubes typically are limited in
weapons to the number of tubes.
Almost any submarine can be equipped with a minebelt.
The minebelts being produced and exported can be attached
with relative ease to a submarine and can provide any nation
with a great increase in the capabilities of their
submarines. These minebelts are usually close to neutral in
buoyancy so as not to upset the operation of the submarine
and they can be jettisoned from inside the submarine in an
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emergency. ("UDT '92 Conference & Exhibition Preview," 1992,
P. 42)
8. Weapons Launching Systems
While the determination of how a submarine launches
a weapon may not seem important, it actually can tell many
things of interest to a naval officer. A submarine that can
impulse 3 a weapon is less limited in its operations because
the submarine can be going at any speed and maneuvering while
still being able to launch its weapon. Also, due to a lack
of propulsion for the underwater missile system, all current
missiles reguire some sort of impulse system to force the
missile out of the tube. A disadvantage of the impulse
system is the amount of noise that is created when the weapon
is launched.
A launch system that reguires swimout weapons is just
the opposite in almost all respects. It is a stealthy way to
launch a weapon, but usually imposes restrictions on speed
and maneuverability on the submarine. The sophistication and
maintenance standards of a swimout launch system are usually
less than for the impulse system, and the internal space
reguirements are significantly less for the swimout system.
9. Surface-to-Air Missile (SAM) Launchers
Since naval guns were removed from submarines, the
submarine has been unable to counter its worst adversary, an
antisubmarine aircraft. This shortcoming could be rectified
impulse: using high pressure air or water ram to force a torpedo or missile out of the torpedo tube.
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by the installation of a surface-to-air missile launcher.
The likely location of the launcher would be in the conning
tower and therefore a close inspection of the top of the sail
might in the uture be required to verify that a particular
submarine has a SAM launcher installed.
B. WEAPONS SYSTEMS
After the capabilities of the submarines have been
evaluated, a survey of the weapons that the submarines can
employ must be done.
1. Torpedoes
The torpedo remains the premier weapon of the
submarine force due to its stealth, destructive power, and
immunity to defensive measures. A submarine crew can be
totally incompetent, and yet as Winston Churchill stated in
a memorandum for the First Sea Lord, 21 October 1939:
It may well be a hundred to one against a hit with a heavy
torpedo upon a ship, but the chance is always there, and
the disproportion is grievous. Like a hero being stung by
a malarious mosquito. (Heinl, 1966, p. 326)
Due to this damage potential, the characteristics of each
type of torpedo need to be collected and the capabilities
then need to be resolved. There is a wide variety of
torpedoes available to a submarine force ranging from the
large heavyweight impulse torpedoes (e.g., Mk 48, Mk 24
Tigerfish, and Type 53) that are usually faster high
performance weapons to the smaller, slower, swim-out
torpedoes (e.g., Mk 37, Stingray, Whitehead A244) . Each
torpedo can have a specific application (ASUW or ASW) or it
47
can be multipurpose. The torpedo could be unguide or it can
have an active or passive homing system. The torpedo
guidance could allow it to be wire-guided, autonomous,
straight-running, or a combination of any of these. The
warhead can be a small shaped-charged designed for double
hull penetration, a large high explosive charge designed to
break the keel of a ship, or even a nuclear weapon to destroy
a battlegroup or a coastal city. Each of these torpedo
characteristics needs to be determined, and even a small
amount of information will allow some or all the aspects to
be judged. (Friedman, 1989, pp. 416-433)
2. Missiles
Only ten nations (China, France, Greece, Israel,
Japan, Netherlands, Russia, Pakistan, the U.K., and the U.S.)
currently have submarine launched missiles of which seven of
those use U. S . -produced HARPOONs (Jane's Fighting Ships,
1992-93) . Although many other nations would like to acguire
this capability, the technology needed is probably beyond the
reach of most developing nations. Any missile system
installed onboard a submarine must be evaluated to determine
whether it is anti-ship, antisubmarine, or land attack and
whether the submarine has to surface to fire the missile or
if the submarine can launch the missile while submerged.
From the dimensions of the missile, range and explosive power
can be estimated. Data pertaining to the accuracy of the
missile would also be extremely important. Any indication of
a nation acquiring or developing this technology would be a
vital piece of information, because to date only four nations
have actually developed submarine launched missiles: China,
France, Russia, and the U.S. (with the Chinese missiles
requiring the submarine to be surfaced)
.
3. Mines
Many types of mines are available to a submarine
force and there are several methods of deploying these mines.
The building or import of mines would neccestate a review of
the submarine force to determine if the submarines are
capable of carrying and deploying the respective mines. This
capability might require the use of minebelts as discussed
earlier, hence a determination must be made concerning
potential for the mine to be deployed from a submarine
torpedo tube or minebelt. The dimensions of the mines should
be established to help determine the deployment limitations.
4 . Countermeasures
Countermeasures are designed to thwart tracking of
the submarine by hostile forces. The ability to employ
countermeasures is a useful indicator of a submarine's
capabilities. A submarine capable of using these deceptive
devices will tend to be more able to avoid destruction in the
event of being detected, drastically improving its survival.
Due to the small size of countermeasures and the equally
diminutive launching mechanisms, determining whether a
submarine can use them may not be easy.
49
5. Surface-to-Air Missiles (SAMs)
The only mention of surface-to-air missiles on
submarines have been with the SA-N-8 Gremlin mounted on a
Russian Kilo class submarine while performing sea trials
(Jane's Fighting Ships, 1992-93, p. 502). Other possible
candidates could be the U. S . -produced Stinger or the U.K.-
produced Blowpipe . These missiles usually have a range of
three miles or less, but the possibility that a nation is
fitting these to its submarines would be of interest in
evaluating the threat presented by the submarine force.
C. SENSORS
The sensors in the submarine are sensitive units,
especially when considering the hydrophones used for the
sonar system. The processing systems can be changed by
removing obsolete equipment cabinets and installing modern
units.
"Modern sonar equipments are based on modular components
with a high proportion of functions that are performed by
software, flexible adaptations to the user's wishes and
requirements are possible especially with regard to the
operation and displays .... For easy installation aboard
existing submarines, the latest technology for high
integration of electronics is used so that only one
Operators's Console is necessary .
"
(Pries, 1986, p. 54)
This applies to the ESM gear as well as the sonar systems and
periscopes. Sound analysis gear is readily available to be
installed on submarines and can be connected to almost any
type of hydrophones. The hydrophones themselves can also be
replaced and improved with only minor modifications while the
submarine is in a drydock.
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A towed array allows a submarine to detect quieter ships
at longer ranges compared to the normal hull-mounted arrays.
The towed array sonar system has been the primary detection
device utilized by U.S. submarines for many years, and even
this sensor is becoming available worldwide with the Moray
1800 submarine design which is offering a "clipped-on towed
array sonar ."( "Submarine Design," 1990, p. 459).
D. NAVIGATION SYSTEMS
The navigation systems are probably the most easily
installed units on the submarine. They are usually small and
easy to operate; they should be evaluated based on their
accuracy, maintainability and reliability. LORAN and OMEGA
systems are readily available to any fishing vessel and,
these combined with celestial navigation, are accurate enough
to allow a submarine to navigate across any expanse of ocean.
Most submarines are now equipped with some sort of ships
inertial navigation system (SINS) which allows for submerged
navigation with improvement over dead-reckoning, satellite
and OMEGA navigation systems, and gyro compasses ("Combat
Information," 1990, p. 461). These units are also small; for
instance, GEC Ferranti produces a submarine version of its
inertial navigation systems which has two units (which
measure 38 x 20 x 21 and 43 x 20 x 21 in.) and a mean time
between failures (MTBF) of 4000 hours (GEC Ferranti, 1992,
p.l). There are also Global Positioning System (GPS)
receivers as small as a notebook which are becoming readily
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available on the open market and which will allow accurate
navigation in all but the most hazardous waters.
E. FIRE CONTROL SYSTEMS
The fire control system aids the submariners in
determining a target's course, speed and range, calculates
the course of the torpedo and sends this information to the
torpedo. The system enables the crew to launch a torpedo
with a reasonable chance of acheiving a hit. A good fire
control system will provide a reliable firing solution in a
relatively short period of time. The more sophisticated and
modern systems will receive inputs from the sonar system and
generate a firing solution without an input from the
operators and the older systems reguire a substantial input
from the crew. A good submarine crew can generate a firing
solution without a fire control system, but manual methods
are usual time-consuming. Although it should be emphasized
that hand computations are guite capable of providing a
firing solution to the submarine commander,
Modern sub-surface warfare with its long ranges and short
reaction times, its multiple contact situations and
complex sensor and weapon resources reguires combat
systems at the leading edge of technology. (Pries, 1986,
p. 50)
This places a nation in the position of having to either
provide extensive training to the crew to operate and
maintain high-technology eguipment or emphasize antiguated
but well tested solutions. The choice a submarine force
makes can provide an indication of the capabilities and
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expertise of the submarine crews. In addition, the choice
will also provide a hint as to the capabilities of the




The naval leadership is an important factor in
determining the effectiveness of a submarine force. The
officer corps should be analyzed to determine their social
status and education since these are important indicators of
officer prestige.
1. Social Status
The stature of naval officers within a society and
the social backgrounds of officers could influence the
effectiveness of the submarine force. Where the officers
come from within the social structure of the nation will
affect their way of doing business or provide them added
influence. Officers who come from elite segments of society
tend to be more influential within the government, possibly
giving the submarine force more leverage in the usually
fierce infighting over resources.
2 . Education
As with social status, a navy that requires officers
to be highly educated would be predisposed to a more
effective submarine force. Extensive education, while not an
absolute necessity for a submarine officer, will tend to give
the officer an advantage in technical skills, management, and
problem solving, thus improving the prospects for becoming a
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competent submariner commander. Note should be taken of the
number of submarine officers which have attended higher
learning institutions.
B. ENLISTED MANPOWER SOURCES
The education and social status of the enlisted submarine
personnel should also be considered in evaluating a submarine
force.
1. Education
The educational level of the enlisted men is as
important to the operational competence of the submarine as
the officers' education. The more knowledgeable the men are
about their jobs and the missions of the submarine, the more
effective the submarine is likely to be in its taskings. The
literacy rate of the country will provide a quick indicator
of the newly enlisted educational level, but a more precise
sign might be the amount of training given the submariners
after enlistment.
2. Social Background
While this aspect for the enlisted man is also
similar to the officer discussion above, the evaluation can
be done in broad perspective by looking at the percentage of
population that is agrarian in nature. The higher the
percentage the more likely the crew will be less capable,
while a higher percentage of the population connected to
seafaring or technical trades will probably be an indication
of an effective force.
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C . MORALE
The nebulous concept of morale needs to be reviewed when
exploring the potential of a submarine force. There are many
items that have effects on morale; while some of them are not
easily determined, a few of the features described below can
be readily determined and applied in assessment of a
submarine force.
1. Esprit de Corps
There are many indications of the esprit de corps of
the submarine force, from shoulder patches or distinctive
uniforms to special privileges and an increased quality of
life. The more obvious symbols of eliteness are easy to
tally and the more distinguishing the symbols the higher
probability that the morale of the submarine force is
elevated. Some of the more obvious examples include
qualification pins, shoulder patches, unusual uniform
decorations, or even completely unique work or dress
uniforms. Other less noticeable illustrations of esprit de
corps are quality of life issues: preferable quarters,
superior medical facilities, pay incentives, and even choice
retirement benefits. Pay incentives are probably the most
basic building blocks for improving morale. The amount a
country pays its submariners relative to the rest of the navy
and to the civilian pay scales can disclose much about the
attitude of the nation toward the submarine force and the
type of personnel who become submariners.
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2. Officer-Enlisted Relationships
A major contributor to morale is the relationship
between the officers and the enlisted men. A submarine is an
environment unequalled in any civilian context if for no
other reason than the extended time periods spent in small
enclosed spaces. The attitudes of the officers pertaining to
the enlisted men must be evaluated to aid in determining the
capabilities of a submarine. A good working relationship is
probably the most important non-material-related gauge of the
effectiveness of a submarine. While it varies from vessel to
vessel and even from time to time, the officer-enlisted
relationship can be assessed generally for a force and
sometimes for specific ships. Knowledge of that relationship
is essential in determining a submarine force's capabilities.
3. Submarine Rescue
The knowledge that equipment is available and
personnel are trained in submarine rescue can add to the
morale of the submarine force. Because most conventional
submarines operate primarily in shallow water areas, the
possibility of rescue in an emergency could provide a morale
boost to a submarine force.
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VII. TRAINING
The training of the submarine crews and their maintenance
personnel is extremely important to the effectiveness of a
submarine force.
A. INTRODUCTION
Training a submarine force to fight is a difficult, time-
consuming, and expensive task. Although basic navigational
skills can be taught to a crew in a relatively short period
of time, developing the crew to be effective warfare
specialists operating as a team takes at least six years
("Creating A Submarine Force The French Way," 1989, p. 47).
This allows time to fully train the captain and crew in the
operational art of placing the submarine in an optimal firing
position without being detected. With less training, a
submarine can still be an effective "smart mine," but this
may not seem worth the cost and resources that the country
invests in a submarine force; it also would be an ineffective
way to utilize a very capable warship. Submarine training
must begin ashore with basic operational training, after
which the training can progress to actual at-sea evolutions.
B. TRAINING ASHORE
Shore training must be looked at in both infrastructure
and realization. Having the facilities is necessary but not
sufficient for a submarine force to be proficient.
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1. Training Infrastructure
The facilities that a nation devotes to submarine
crew training provide an indication for determining a
submarine force's ability to perform a given mission. Any
review of shore training must include the types of facilities
available to the crew. All aspects of submarine operations
should be represented in the training structures -- diving
trainers, weapons control and launching, fire control
procedures, engineering operations, damage control trainers,
and emergency escape training. The more elaborate are the
training systems, the less time the crew needs to spend at
sea to become proficient.
2. Training Realization
A review of the shore establishment should include
the amount of time that a particular crew spends using the
facilities. The initial stages of training can take place
within the country or conducted in a foreign country for
initial manning of new submarines. This training period does
not need to be lengthy in nature, but it must encompass the
theoretical aspects of submarine control and basic system
operations. In the Federal German Navy, this initial
operational training takes three months for enlisted
personnel and six months for technical officers (Hartmann,
1986, pp. 108-109) . Further shore-based training is
customary after extensive refits or large changeouts of the
crew. The training aspects discussed should not be
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overlooked when trying to determine the missions and
capabilities of a submarine force.
C. AT-SEA TRAINING
The at-sea training of the crews is of primary importance
in evaluating the capabilities of a submarine. The most
capable submarines in the world will be ineffective if the
crews are not properly trained. Training at sea should be
thoroughly examined to give the best perspective on the
competence of the crew to perform a given mission. A
submarine crew that has never been trained in ASW operations
would probably be ineffective in executing that assignment.
The types of operation that a submarine is capable of
accomplishing are of such a varied nature that being trained
in one mission does not indicate a capability in another
mission. A submarine crew that is very good at performing
commando insertion/extraction exercises or reconnaissance
missions may not be a real threat against a formation of
surface warships, while a crew which is very proficient at
anti-surface warfare may have little success in locating and
attacking a submerged submarine.
A detailed analysis of all training exercises should be
accomplished to determine the nature of each exercise and the
units involved. Lengthy independent steaming gives an
indication of the proficiency of the crew in maintaining the
ship without tender or shore support, which in turn implies
an ability of the submarine to perform extended operational
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patrols. Although some tasks can be performed with little or
no training, the ability to conduct an extended patrol should
not be assumed of any operational submarine. A submarine can
conduct routine operations in shallow waters within sight of
land; but the ability to deploy over a great distance takes
practice and training and requires a high degree of
confidence in both maintenance skills and navigational
effectiveness. The French regularly send their diesel
submarines on long patrols to the Indian Ocean for crew
training in remote areas of the world's oceans (Fustier,
1989, pp. 32-36). Ships which often go in and out of port
might be assessed as having a high degree of operational
proficiency, but that submarine may not be able to conduct an
extended wartime patrol.
Similar consideration should be given to snorkeling
evolutions. A submarine which snorkels often might be
exhibiting proficiency in operating at snorkel depth, but
there are many other possible reasons, e.g., the submarine
crew is demonstrating its inability to remain submerged on
battery power, a reliance on external navigation, a
requirement to maintain communications, or even a lack of
confidence in the submarine's ability to return to the
surface.
1. Training Missions
Every time a submarine goes to sea, every effort
should be made to gather as much as information on its
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operations as possible. All operations that are conducted
must be analyzed to further aid in determining the
capabilities of the submarine force. The U.S. axiom that a
navy trains as it fights and fights as it trains is just as
applicable to other submarine forces. The basic abilities of
a submarine force will be evident during the operational
exercises that are conducted. The frequency of noisy
evolutions, the manner in which the submarine searches for an
enemy, and the ability to maintain depth control are just a
few of the examples which will tend to disclose the
capabilities of a submarine force.
2. Routine Evolutions
This subject goes hand-in-hand with the concept of
operations discussed later, but is more related • to the
tactical scale of operations. The submarine should be
evaluated based on its ability to conduct routine evolutions
safely, quietly, and effectively. These evolutions can be as
simple as dumping trash to the more complex loading of
weapons to the very critical evolution of coming to periscope
depth. The evolutions need to be evaluated in three aspects:
safety, stealth, and competence.
D. FOREIGN ADVISORS
The experience of foreign advisors tends to greatly
benefit any training program. These advisors can range from
non-participating observers to hands-on trainers to actual
operators. The extent of the advisors' involvement will
62
probably relate to the competence of the crew. If a foreign
country needs to supply actual operators, it is likely that




The types and frequency of submarine operations are
indispensable in helping to determine the capabilities of a
submarine force as are the causes and frequency of aborted
operations.
A. OPERATIONAL ASPECTS
There is probably no better indication of the warfighting
capabilities of a submarine force than the operations that it
conducts in peacetime. Every aspect of operations needs to
be examined in detail to ensure that all facets of submarine
capabilities are explored.
1. Duration
The ability of a submarine to operate at-sea for an
extended period of time is absolutely essential. The
psychology of the crew and the durability of the equipment to
perform lengthy patrols can only be tested by actually
performing a sustained at-sea operating patrol.
2. Location
Where the submarines operate is also important.
Submarines that deploy across vast expanses of ocean are
probably the most capable submarines. To deploy long
distances requires good navigational skills, confidence in
the crew and equipment, high endurance platforms, and
reliable communications. All of these capabilities were
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common place among the major submarine powers in World War
Two, but they cannot be matched by most nations that
currently possess submarines.
3. Command and Control
The experience of World War Two has shown the world
the importance of command, control, communications, and
intelligence (C 3 I) in relation to submarine operations. The
German U-Boats were much more effective when used in
coordination with other U-boats and when provided
intelligence of convoy movements. This lesson should force
us to keep a watchful eye on the ability of a shore-based
naval component to communicate with and direct the operations
of a submarine at-sea.
4. Participating Units
The operations that a submarine performs with other
platforms should be analyzed to determine if the submarine is
just acting as a target or if there is an actual combined
operation taking place.
5. Types of Operations
Clearly, the emphasis placed on anti-surface warfare
versus antisubmarine warfare needs to be reviewed to help
determine the possible uses of submarines in times of
conflict. An indication of proficiency in one aspect of
submarine operations might be repetitive training in this
area. A lack of apparent training in another area might be
an indicator of inability to perform the mission. These are
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not set in stone, because a submarine crew highly proficient
in antisubmarine warfare is probably quite capable of
conducting an anti-surface approach and attack, although the
reverse may not be true.
B. FREQUENCY OF OPERATIONS
The types of operations that the submarines perform are
important in the analysis, but a submarine that conducts one
extensive operation every five years is not likely to be an
effective platform. The operations must be conducted
routinely to allow the crews to become proficient and ensure
that the equipment is dependable. A comprehensive schedule
should be made of each submarine's operational schedule to
allow more thorough analysis of the capabilities of the
submarine.
C. ABORTED MISSIONS
When a submarine must abort a mission, the reason for the
cancellation must be determined. Given a thorough history of
each submarine's operations, a good analyst can conduct a
review of past terminations to reach an indication of the
reliability and maintainability of the submarines. The
reason for aborting a mission might be related to the lack of
redundancy of onboard equipment or the inability of the
submarine crew to repair the equipment at-sea.
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IX. IRAN: A CASE STUDY
What has been presented above has been a theoritical
mehtod for analyzing the capabilities and missions of a
submarine force. This analysis method will now be applied to
the newest submarine force: Iran's.
A. NATIONAL ASPECTS
Iran has undergone drastic leadership changes over the
past thirteen years, but the geography and characteristics of
the people have remained essentially stable.
1. Geography
Iran is a large country (636,296 sguare miles, about
the size of California, Arizona, New Mexico, and Texas
combined) that has a high interior region bounded by massive
mountain ranges. The coastal areas are very narrow regions
between the mountains and the shore. The surrounding seas
are split by the Straits of Hormuz, and Iran has territorial
sea perimeters of 900 km in the Arabian Gulf and 600 km in
the Gulf of Oman. (Encyclopedia Brittanica, 1973, p. 821)
The Arabian Gulf is fairly shallow throughout its
entire length and the Gulf of Oman is also relatively shallow
out to 75 or 100 kilometers, but after that the Gulf of Oman
quickly changes into the Indian Ocean and deepens
significantly. This tomography should require the Iranian
navy to have a submarine force capable of blue-water
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operations if anything more than a coastal defense role is
envisioned.
2. Characteristics Of The Nation
The people of Iran are intensely religious, as was
evident in the fundamentalist overthrow of the Shah in 1979.
Their reliance on the army to protect the land borders from
invasion is juxtaposed by their reliance on sea-based trade
for their economic and social survival.
a. Leadership And Status
The leadership of Iran and its military starts at
the Iranian Commander-in-Chief known as the Faqhih (The
Supreme Jurist) . This is the position created by Ayattolah
Rouhollah Al-Moussavi Al-Khomeini and currently taken by
Ayatollah Hojatolislam Khamenei. The Faqhih is also the
country's spiritual leader. This is a very powerful
position, especially when the man is a very charismatic
leader like Khomeini, who was the Islamic Republic's founder
and the revolution's spiritual leader. Since his death, the
position has become weaker, mainly due to the offsetting
power possessed by the President, Ali Akbar Hashemi
Rafsanjani. Rafsanjani has moved rapidly to consolidate his
power and has been very successful
.
(Malek, 1991, p. 1).
Rafsanjani has expressed a desire for Iran to
become a major political, economic, and military power in the
region and even in international circles. Although Iran has
stressed that peace is its only goal throughout the region,
68
many nations are skeptical because Iran is still continuing
to build the largest military force in the area of the
Arabian Gulf and the Gulf of Oman. The Iranian response to
these accusations is that its military must be made strong to
ensure that the Islamic Republic can play a major role in the
western Indian Ocean. The Iranian leaders have been guoted
as saying that as "the strongest state in the region, Iran
can better guarantee the security of the region. "( "JDW
Interview," March 1991, P. 304) This statement alone shows
the importance that Iran places on their military strength,
and indicates that Iran might probably use their military in
a coercive manner to persue its interests in the area.
b. Characteristics of the Population
Despite their reliance on oil exports, the
Iranian people are mainly agrarian in nature, with 33% of
their population engaged in agriculture, 21% in
manufacturing, and an unemployment rate of 30%. Iran has a
shortage of skilled labor and is not self-sufficient in any
economic area including food. (World Factbook
, 1991, pp. 146-
147)
The use of the sea is not foreign to Iran, but
the large land borders have in the past given the Iranian
people an easier way to trade. Recent population growth,
poor relations with land neighbors, and the vast quantity of
oil exported have shifted Iranian attention to the use of the
sea in supporting its national interests.
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c. Role of the Navy
During the Iran-Iraq War, the Iranian Navy proved
its ability to contain the Iraqi Navy and was quite
successful in taking the war to the enemy's homeland. Late
in the war (1986), the Navy shifted units to the south that
ended up in skirmishes with the U.S. Navy over the mining of
the Persian Gulf and the Straits of Hormuz. The skirmishes
with the U.S. Navy showed that the Iranian Navy was not as
good as their early success against Iraq lead some observers
to believe. The fighting caused the loss of one frigate and
two fast patrol craft, with varying degrees of damage to
other ships. Very little damage was inflicted on the U.S.
Navy in return. (Cordesman, 1990, pp. 530-548)
The Navy in 1992 is the only portion of the
Iranian military capable of going on the offensive, and it is
continuing its buildup. As it grows, the Navy is remains
centered around units from the Shah's navy. Due to the loss
of several vessels in the Iran-Iraq War, ship acquisitions
began during the war. An interesting view of naval
priorities is shown by the types of ships which were
acquired. Sixty-six naval units were procured during the
course of the war: 8 amphibious ships and 8 support ships (1
replenishment ship) ; the rest were coastal patrol craft and
small auxiliaries (Jane's Fighting Ships, 1992-93, pp. 293-
300) . The patrol vessels were replacements for ships lost
during the war, but Iran did not lose support or amphibious
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ships. This suggests that Iran is developing a navy capable
of sustained operations in a power projection role. In fact,
the Iranian Chief of Naval Operations has stated that "his
fleet plans 'to control the Strait of Hormuz ' and to become
a 'blue-water navy'" and that the KILO submarines are needed
to help in "controlling the approaches to the Persian
Gulf ." (Sheafer, 1992)
d. Size of the Submarine Force
Iran is acguiring at least two Kilo Class
submarines from Russia which would place it in the small
submarine force category. This means that the submarines are
likely to be used in one of four missions: coastal defense,
special operations, mining, or commerce raiding. Iran's
history of using mines would make this a viable mission,
while its location at the Straits of Hormuz makes these
submarines feasible platforms for the "intelligent mine"
mission.
e. Traditions
The Iranian Navy has operated midget submarines
for several years, but this is not likely to give them an
edge in their utilization of a modern warfighting fleet
submarine. The majority of the Iranian population probably
did not know of the existence of these midget submarines, and
their limited operational potential would not likely give
them high standing within the naval hierarchy. Thus the
Iranian submarine tradition is short and possibly nonexistent.
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3. Overseas Interests
Iran relies on overseas trade for hard currency in
the sale of its oil and to bring in food and materials to
help build the economy.
a. Distance and Trade Routes
Most of Iran's exports are on ocean-going vessels
to nations that are quite distant (Japan, Turkey, Italy,
Netherlands, Spain, France, and Germany) and all of the oil
must go through the Straits of Hormuz. The navy seems
content with trying to monitor the northwest corner of the
Indian Ocean, but as the navy acquires more ships the dream
of sea control out to farther corners of the Indian Ocean
will likely grow.
b. Nature of Trade
As mentioned earlier, 90% of Iran's exports is
petroleum. Overseas trade is needed to bring in enough food
supplies, machinery, and technical services to keep the
economy going. Without the imports of food, Iran would
probably suffer a famine. This implies that Iran must have
a strong navy to insure that the needed food supplies can get
into Iranian ports. Actually, strength at sea is a relative
notion, since a major maritime power can impose an effective
blockade.
c. Foreign Relations
Due to the leadership of President Rafsanjani,
Iran reportedly is trying to establish relations with the
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western world. Rafsanjani recognizes that Iran cannot
develop in isolation, and the West, although looked upon as
evil, is the best source of money and resources for helping
to rebuild the war-shattered economy which is President
Rafsanjani's number one concern (Malek, 1991, p.l).
Iran is also trying to develop ties outside the
region based on the selling of arms produced indigenously.
While their technology is not equal to the industrial
countries, Iran cannot be independent of foreign controls
unless their arms industry can support their military
requirements. Economies of scale dictate that this is not
economically feasible unless the Islamic Republic becomes an
arms supplier. Major General Mohsen Rezai, Commander of the
Iranian Revolutionary Guards Corps, is very proud of:
our achievement of self-reliance in the field of weapon
production, and our breakthrough in resolving complicated
problems of electronics in weapons systems. In a few
years, God willing, we will not only produce enough
armaments to fulfil our needs but also to export .( "JDW
Interview," November 1991, p. 980)
This will place Iran in a very large group of arms exporters.
B. INDUSTRIAL AND TECHNOLOGICAL CAPABILITIES
Iran's modernization program was set back by the loss of
the Shah's guidance, but after thirteen years, the industrial
and technological capabilities of the nation are beginning to
make a recovery.
1. Research and development
There is no evidence that Iran is attempting to
explore the ocean areas in any way that would help their
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submarine force. Iran's investment in research and
development seems mostly centered around its arms industry.
Money has been devoted recently to the co-development of
Scuds with Syria which are capable of carrying chemical
warheads (Haberman, 1992, p. 3).
2. Indigenous Production And Imports
Iran is not yet producing the Kilo submarines; but
they do have the infrastructure, dockyard facilities, and
experience (gained from repairing crippled ships during the
Iran-Irag War) which have led one writer to suggest that
"Iran will, if so desired, have no trouble in building her
own hulls.
"
(Slade, 1991, p. 32) Iran is unable to manufacture
the sensors and weapons systems which are needed to equip a
modern naval platform, therefore these systems will have to
be acquired from overseas (Slade, 1991, p. 32). Iran, like
many other developing nations, does have the ability to
reverse engineer equipment to some extent and this could be
the source of spare parts for their submarines.
3. Maintenance And Repair
Iran has ship repair facilities at only Bandar Abbas.
Iranians have the capability to repair naval warships, as
they proved by almost totally rebuilding the frigate Sabalan
after having "her back broken by three Harpoon missiles and
five laser-guided Rockeye cluster bombs ." (Slade, 1991, p. 32)
The major repair facility is the Persian Gulf Shipbuilding
Corporation in Bandar Abbas which has the capability to
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repair vessels up to 28,000 tons (Fairplay World Shipping
Directory, 1992-1993, p. 285). This is the only facility in
the country that can repair submarines. Notice should be
taken of any expansion of this facility or the building of
any future repair facilities. Where the Iranian Navy will
send its submarines for major overhauls is not known.
4. Specialized Industries
Iran does not presently have the specialized
industrial capabilities required to maintain their
submarines, so Iran will be dependent on foreign suppliers
for these skills and parts.
C. INFRASTRUCTURE
1. Submarine Bases
Iran does not yet have a submarine base, but Jane's
Fighting Ships, 1991-92 (p. 286) states that a submarine base
is being built at Chah Bahar on the Gulf of Oman, some 70
miles west of Pakistan and 250 miles east of the Straits of
Hormuz . With only two submarines being delivered it can be
assumed that there will only be one submarine base for some
time to come. The submarines will likely be based in Bandar
Abbas until the submarine base is completed. A determination
should be made as to the amount of pier space which is being
built at Chah Bahar to help aid in the analysis of the
projected size of the submarine force. Due to the limited
nature of the Iranian Navy, submarine tenders are not seen as
necessary, but any discussion of acquiring a tender would
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imply a major shift in Iranian intentions. Also, an estimate
must be made of the potential for building drydocks, and the




The Kilo submarine is the newest conventional
submarine produced by Russia and it is designed for ocean-
going operations. It is a large submarine and, at 3076 tons
submerged displacement, is large even by diesel submarine
standards. This size makes it a very poor shallow water
submarine, but many nations are acquiring Kilo submarines due
to their relatively cheap price tag. "The Iranians are
reported to have paid $2.1m [U.S. dollars] for each of their
three 'Kilo' submarines," about 1 per cent of a Western
submarine.
"
(Preston, 1992, p. 15) The modern technology
involved in the Kilo submarine makes it a formidable
platform. The maintenance requirements should be
comparatively routine for the near future, although poor
upkeep will probably cause the submarines to deteriorate
rapidly.
a. Capabilities
While many aspects of the Kilo submarine are
unknown, the data available in Jane's Fighting Ships, 1992-93
(p. 294) is enough to begin an analysis of the Iranian
submarine force capabilities. The patrol endurance of the
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Kilo is about 50 days based on nominal fuel consumption and
consumable loadouts, although this number can be increased by
conserving fuel and storing extra food and supplies. The
submerged endurance is quoted as 400 nautical miles at 3
knots which would allow the Kilo to be submerged for over
five days while patrolling a strait or coastal area. This
range will allow the Kilo to transit to the Straits of Hormuz
while remaining submerged, but the Kilo will not be able to
return to Chah Bahar submerged. The cruising range of the
Kilo (6000 nm at 7 kts) will allow the Iranian submarine
force to patrol the entire Arabian Sea, most of the Red Sea,
and a major portion of the western Indian Ocean. Jane's
lists the submerged speed as 17 kts, but the equations
presented above give a speed of 23 kts. This is a more
realistic speed based on the size of the Kilo and its large
propulsion motor.
Jb. Missions
The Kilo submarine was designed by the former
Soviet Union as a multi-purpose platform to replace its aging
fleet of diesel submarines and has all but replaced earlier
classes. For this reason the Kilo is likely to be very
suitable for all missions that can be assigned a diesel
submarine, with the possible exception of strike warfare.
The Shark Teeth sonar system is a very capable system for ASW
and ASUW, and if armed with Russian Type 53 torpedoes, the
Kilo can not only detect ships but sink them as well. The
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Kilo can deploy mines from its torpedo tubes and has the
interior room for conducting special operations. The
capability to launch missiles is not credited to the Kilo,
but with the proliferation of Harpoon and Exocet missiles,
and the ability to retrofit a submarine with the required
control equipment, this capability must be assumed of any
modern submarine. Jane's Fighting Ships, 1992-93 also
specualtes about the possible installation of a surface-to-
air missile system on some Kilo submarines. This should be
investigated further after the delivery of the submarines.
The normal torpedo loadout is 18 Type 53 or two mines in
place of one torpedo. These weapons must be impulse launched
which gives the Kilo operational flexibility in depth and
speed while engaging targets
.
(Jane 's Fighting Ships, 1992-
993, p. 268 & 294)
2 . Weapons Systems
As mentioned above, the Type 53 Russian torpedo is
the likely weapon of choice, although any number of available
torpedoes can be utilized by the Kilo after modification. No
missiles will be deployed until some modification is given to
the submarine also. Iran has employed mines for many
purposes in the past, and in any future conflict or crisis,
the reappearance of Iranian mines in the Arabian Gulf, the
Straits of Hormuz , or the Gulf of Oman should not be totally
unexpected. An analysis of the Iran-Iraq War shows that a
major strategic concept for Iran is the willingness to
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escalate war rapidly from a strictly military land conflict
to a total war including naval combat, ballistic missile
strikes against civilian populations, attacks on neutral
shipping, with missiles and indiscriminate mining of
international waterways (Barbero, 1989, pp. 25-26). Russian
countermeasures will likely be supplied with the submarines,
and if a SAM launcher is installed, SA-N-8 Gremlin will
probably be the missiles used.
3. Sensor/Navigation/Fire Control systems
The Shark Teeth medium-frequency detection and
tracking sonar system and the Mouse Roar high-frequency
attack sonar are standard equipment for the Kilo submarine .
These sonar systems have proven to be reliable in service
with the ex-Soviet Navy, so their reliability and
maintainability should not be in doubt. The navigation
systems will probably include Loran and Omega units with the
possibility of a satellite navigation receiver. With the
availability of GPS receivers, this is a likely device to be
installed, although Iran may not have facilities to repair
any of the mentioned electronic equipment.
E. PERSONNEL
The Iranian military went through major changes during
the revolution and in the long conflict with Iraq.
1. Officer Leadership
Of the 55,000 officers in the Shah's military, over
12,000 officers were purged, either by execution or by forced
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retirement. Most of the purged officers were from the Army,
while very few were Navy.(Zabh, pp. 118-123) This gave Iran
a good foundation for building a wartime navy and these men
who developed strategic concepts in defeat and in victory
which are likely to govern future Iranian military actions.
As for the educational level of the officer corps, there are
eighteen universities that have technical or engineering
departments with about 125,000 students, and another ninety
colleges and technological institutions that can possibly
offer the navy a selection of highly trained and competent
individuals (World of Learning 1992, pp. 724-729). In
addition there is a maritime school, the Chah Bahar College
of Nautical Studies, for the teaching of various seagoing-





2. Enlisted Manpower Sources
This subject must be approached from a broad
perspective when looking through the literature. As
mentioned earlier, Iran is an agrarian nation which can make
it difficult to find the manpower needed to operate modern
complex warships. Its literacy rate is only 54% and there
are two major languages spoken (Persian and Turkic) among it
15 million work force (World Factbook , 1991, p. 146) . The
ability to take men unacquainted with the ways of the sea and
teach them naval matters and submarine systems is a long and
complex process which can take many years. This alone should
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give an indication that the quality of the Iranian submarines
will not be prominent for at least several years.
3. Morale
The esprit de corps of the submarine force will
likely be limited at first due to a lack of history. As the
force becomes better trained and more experienced, it is
likely to develop an eliteness like most other submarine
forces. The officers will probably form a closer bond to the
enlisted personnel due to the extremely cramped conditions
inherent in the submerged environment. And the esprit de
corps could probably be strengthened if a form of rescue from
a stranded submerged submarine is provided as an integral
part of the submarine force. All of these factors will
probably influence morale and should be carefully considered
when determining the missions and capabilities of the
submarine force.
F. TRAINING
Since the submarines have yet to arrive, no real analysis
can be performed on the training environment of the submarine
force. As discussed, the training facilities which are being
erected at Chah Bahar, the training facilities used by other
parts of the navy, and the utilization of those training
systems, should be studied. An examination of the Iranian
surface navy will also give a suggestion of the types,
complexity, and thoroughness of their training. This can
then be extrapolated to the future at-sea training
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environment of the submarine force. The quantity of foreign
advisors will probably decrease in number as the submarine
force becomes more proficient at operations, and this might
give a good indication of the operational readiness of the
Iranian crews to perform actual missions.
G. OPERATIONS
As with training, the operations that the submarine force
performs can only be inferred from the current operations
performed by the surface navy. All the items discussed above
should be carefully reviewed after the Iranians take
possession of the Kilo submarines.
H. CONCLUSIONS
Using locally available unclassified resources and the
method articulated in this study, some inferences- may be
drawn about the future capabilities of the Iranian submarine
force.
Firstly, the Kilo submarine is a highly capable platform
that should be able to fulfill any assigned missions. It is
a blue-water submarine with a range that could allow the
Iranian navy to influence events several thousand miles from
the Arabian Gulf.
The second inference that can be drawn is that the
capabilities of the Iranian crews will be limited for several
years due to inexperience in submarine operations. After a
short period of training, the submarines will likely be
capable of performing only restricted independent operations
close to their base with a possibility of executing an
"intelligent mine" mission in the Straits of Hormuz and the
Gulf of Oman. The submarine force will probably be many
years from becoming an integrated member of a navy task
group.
The last prediction is that Iran, possessing submarines
will likely use them in any future conflict to achieve their
goals. Whether against hostile naval or merchant vessels or
even neutral shipping, the Iranian submarine force will be
directed to use the destructive weapons at their disposal.
However it should be noted that these conclusions are
drawn from locally available sources and limited research.
Applying this method with more complete and current
information and tapping classified resources for an all-
source analysis should yield a much more reliable appraisal




The method presented in this thesis for evaluating the
missions and capabilities of a Third World submarine force is
meant to provide an informed reader with the basic building
blocks to begin an analysis. It should be stressed that a
sufficient application of the method would compel the use of
highly classified intelligence data, specific and thorough
open-source research information, and special collection
tasking of attaches, ships, submarines, aircraft, and other
collection methods. It is desired that this unclassified,
limited open-source assessment model for evaluating a
submarine force will encourage an all-source application on
all potentially hostile submarine forces.
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APPENDIX: CHECKLIST FOR EVALUATION
GEOGRAPHY (i.e. island or sea-based nation, length of
territorial seas, and depth and extent of surrounding waters)
CHARACTERISTICS OF THE NATION (i.e. leadership views, world
status, population characteristics, the navy's role, size of
the submarine force, and naval traditions)
OVERSEAS INTERESTS (i.e. distance and routes of sea-based
trade, nature of sea trade, and foreign relations)
INDUSTRIAL AND TECHNOLOGICAL CAPABILITIES
RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT (i.e. oceanographic and weapons)
INDIGENOUS PRODUCTION AND IMPORTS (i.e. submarines, spare
parts, and weapons)
MAINTENANCE AND REPAIR (i.e. number of facilities, location
of overhauls or routine maintenance, duration, and quality)
SPECIALIZED INDUSTRIES (i.e. technical development and
production in the fields of optics, welding, electronics,
batteries, advanced technologies, and sound silencing
technologies)
INFRASTRUCTURE
SUBMARINE BASES (i.e. number of bases and pier space,
tenders, drydocks, and training facilities)
EQUIPMENT (i.e. age, complexity, and maintainability of the
submarine's sensors, navigation systems, and fire control
systems)
SUBMARINES (i.e. size, age, technology, number for a given
mission, weapon storage, weapons launching systems, and
surface-to-air missile (sam) launchers)
CAPABILITIES (i.e. patrol endurance, submerged endurance,
range, open-ocean potential, and speed)
MISSIONS POSSIBILITIES (i.e. ASW, ASUW, special operations,
mining, surveillance, reconnaissance, electronic warfare,
strike, and search and rescue)
WEAPONS SYSTEMS (i.e. size, technology, and effectiveness of
torpedoes, missiles, mines, countermeasures, and surface-to-
air missiles)
PERSONNEL (i.e. officer social status and education, enlisted
manpower education and social background, esprit de corps,
officer-enlisted relationships, and submarine rescue)
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TRAINING
TRAINING ASHORE (i.e. training infrastructure and training
realization)
AT-SEA TRAINING (i.e. training missions and routine
evolutions)
FOREIGN ADVISORS (i.e. number and purpose)
SUBMARINE OPERATIONS (i.e. duration, location, C 3 I,
participating units, types of operations, freguency of
operations, and freguency and causes of aborted missions)
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